A Side-Channel Attack on a Masked IND-CCA Secure Saber KEM Implementation

Authors

  • Kalle Ngo KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
  • Elena Dubrova KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
  • Qian Guo Lund University (LTH), Lund, Sweden
  • Thomas Johansson Lund University (LTH), Lund, Sweden

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2021.i4.676-707

Keywords:

Public-key cryptography, post-quantum cryptography, Saber KEM, LWE/LWR-based KEM, side-channel attack, power analysis, deep learning

Abstract

In this paper, we present a side-channel attack on a first-order masked implementation of IND-CCA secure Saber KEM. We show how to recover both the session key and the long-term secret key from 24 traces using a deep neural network created at the profiling stage. The proposed message recovery approach learns a higher-order model directly, without explicitly extracting random masks at each execution. This eliminates the need for a fully controllable profiling device which is required in previous attacks on masked implementations of LWE/LWR-based PKEs/KEMs. We also present a new secret key recovery approach based on maps from error-correcting codes that can compensate for some errors in the recovered message. In addition, we discovered a previously unknown leakage point in the primitive for masked logical shifting on arithmetic shares.

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Published

2021-08-11

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

A Side-Channel Attack on a Masked IND-CCA Secure Saber KEM Implementation. (2021). IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2021(4), 676-707. https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2021.i4.676-707