Masking in Fine-Grained Leakage Models: Construction, Implementation and Verification


  • Gilles Barthe MPI-SP, Germany; IMDEA Software Institute, Spain
  • Marc Gourjon Hamburg University of Technology, Germany; NXP Semiconductors, Germany
  • Benjamin Grégoire Inria, France
  • Maximilian Orlt TU Darmstadt, Germany
  • Clara Paglialonga TU Darmstadt, Germany
  • Lars Porth TU Darmstadt, Germany



Side-channel resilience, Higher-order masking, Probing security, Verification, Domain Specific Language


We propose a new approach for building efficient, provably secure, and practically hardened implementations of masked algorithms. Our approach is based on a Domain Specific Language in which users can write efficient assembly implementations and fine-grained leakage models. The latter are then used as a basis for formal verification, allowing for the first time formal guarantees for a broad range of device-specific leakage effects not addressed by prior work. The practical benefits of our approach are demonstrated through a case study of the PRESENT S-Box: we develop a highly optimized and provably secure masked implementation, and show through practical evaluation based on TVLA that our implementation is practically resilient. Our approach significantly narrows the gap between formal verification of masking and practical security.



How to Cite

Barthe, G., Gourjon, M., Grégoire, B., Orlt, M., Paglialonga, C., & Porth, L. (2021). Masking in Fine-Grained Leakage Models: Construction, Implementation and Verification. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2021(2), 189–228.