Generic Side-channel attacks on CCA-secure lattice-based PKE and KEMs
Keywords:Lattice-based cryptography, EM-based side-channel attack, LWE/LWR, Chosen Ciphertext Attack, Public Key Encryption, Key Encapsulation Mechanism
In this work, we demonstrate generic and practical EM side-channel assisted chosen ciphertext attacks over multiple LWE/LWR-based Public Key Encryption (PKE) and Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM) secure in the chosen ciphertext model (IND-CCA security). We show that the EM side-channel information can be efficiently utilized to instantiate a plaintext checking oracle, which provides binary information about the output of decryption, typically concealed within IND-CCA secure PKE/KEMs, thereby enabling our attacks. Firstly, we identified EM-based side-channel vulnerabilities in the error correcting codes (ECC) enabling us to distinguish based on the value/validity of decrypted codewords. We also identified similar vulnerabilities in the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform which leaks information about decrypted messages applicable to schemes that do not use ECC. We subsequently exploit these vulnerabilities to demonstrate practical attacks applicable to six CCA-secure lattice-based PKE/KEMs competing in the second round of the NIST standardization process. We perform experimental validation of our attacks on implementations taken from the open-source pqm4 library, running on the ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. Our attacks lead to complete key-recovery in a matter of minutes on all the targeted schemes, thus showing the effectiveness of our attack.
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Copyright (c) 2020 Prasanna Ravi, Sujoy Sinha Roy, Anupam Chattopadhyay, Shivam Bhasin
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.