Differential Fault Attacks on Deterministic Lattice Signatures


  • Leon Groot Bruinderink Technische Universiteit Eindhoven
  • Peter Pessl Graz University of Technology




Differential fault attacks, post-quantum cryptography, lattice-based cryptography, digital signatures


In this paper, we extend the applicability of differential fault attacks to lattice-based cryptography. We show how two deterministic lattice-based signature schemes, Dilithium and qTESLA, are vulnerable to such attacks. In particular, we demonstrate that single random faults can result in a nonce-reuse scenario which allows key recovery. We also expand this to fault-induced partial nonce-reuse attacks, which do not corrupt the validity of the computed signatures and thus are harder to detect.
Using linear algebra and lattice-basis reduction techniques, an attacker can extract one of the secret key elements after a successful fault injection. Some other parts of the key cannot be recovered, but we show that a tweaked signature algorithm can still successfully sign any message. We provide experimental verification of our attacks by performing clock glitching on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. In particular, we show that up to 65.2% of the execution time of Dilithium is vulnerable to an unprofiled attack, where a random fault is injected anywhere during the signing procedure and still leads to a successful key-recovery.



How to Cite

Groot Bruinderink, L., & Pessl, P. (2018). Differential Fault Attacks on Deterministic Lattice Signatures. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2018(3), 21–43. https://doi.org/10.13154/tches.v2018.i3.21-43