

# Integral Cryptanalysis of WARP based on Monomial Prediction

Hosein Hadipour    Maria Eichlseder

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# Motivation and Our Contributions

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- ✔ Integral analysis of WARP

## Contributions

- ✔ Providing a generic SAT model for integral analysis based on monomial prediction
- ✔ Our model takes the key schedule into account
- ✔ We proposed a tool for key-recovery taking the FFT technique into account
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# Outline

- 1 Boolean Functions and Integral Analysis
- 2 Monomial Prediction and Our SAT Model
- 3 Application of Our Modeling to Integral Analysis of WARP
- 4 Key-Recovery
- 5 Conclusion

# Boolean Functions and Integral Analysis



# Integral Distinguisher and The Coefficients of ANF

$$\text{⬠} \quad y = f(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}) = \sum_{\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} \sum_{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}_2^k} a_{\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}} \mathbf{k}^{\mathbf{v}} \mathbf{x}^{\mathbf{u}}$$


$$\text{⬠} \quad \mathbb{C}_{\mathbf{u}} = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \mid \mathbf{x} \leq \mathbf{u}\}$$

$$\text{Ⓜ} \quad a_{\mathbf{u}}(\mathbf{k}) = \sum_{\mathbf{x} \leq \mathbf{u}} f(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x})$$

🔔 Which monomial is key-independent in the ANF?

⬠ zero-sum:  $\exists \mathbf{u}, s.t. \forall \mathbf{k} : a_{\mathbf{u}}(\mathbf{k}) = 0$

⬠ one-sum:  $\exists \mathbf{u}, s.t. \forall \mathbf{k} : a_{\mathbf{u}}(\mathbf{k}) = 1$



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
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
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
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
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
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# Monomial Prediction and Our SAT Model




## Core Idea of Monomial Prediction [Hu+20]




### Core Idea

The absence (or presence) of a monomial in the ANF of a composite function can be checked by tracking the propagation of the given monomial through the building blocks of composite functions.


# Monomial Trail and Integral Distinguisher




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


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


# Monomial Trail and Integral Distinguisher



$$k^w x^u \not\rightarrow y^v \Rightarrow k^w x^u \not\rightarrow y^v$$

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


$$y^v = \sum_{u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} \sum_{v \in \mathbb{F}_2^k} a_{u,v} k^v x^u = \sum_{u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} a_u(k) \cdot x^u$$

## From Monomial Trails to Integral Distinguisher

- If  $\exists u$  s.t.  $k^w x^u \not\rightarrow y^v$  for all  $w \in \mathbb{F}_2^k$  then  $a_u(k) = 0$  (zero-sum)
- If  $\exists u$  s.t.  $k^w x^u \not\rightarrow y^v$  for all  $w \in \mathbb{F}_2^k \setminus \{0\}$  then  $a_u(k) = \text{constant}$  (zero/one-sum)

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


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


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
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- 🔗 Model the propagation of monomial trails through the building blocks by a CNF clause
- 🚩 Main variables are the monomial exponents, i.e.,  $u, w, v, \dots$  not  $x, k, y, \dots$
- 📍 Fix  $u$  to a certain vector and set  $v$  to  $e_i$  ( $w$  should be a free variable but non-zero)
- 🏠 Any possible solution of the model is a monomial trail from  $k^w x^u$  to  $y^v$
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
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
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


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
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# Monomial Prediction Table (MPT)

- Let  $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x})$  be an  $m$ -bit to  $n$ -bit vectorial Boolean function. Then  $\text{MPT}(\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}) = 1$  if  $\mathbf{x}^{\mathbf{u}} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{f}} \mathbf{y}^{\mathbf{v}}$ , and  $\text{MPT}(\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}) = 0$  otherwise.

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$x$	$S(x)$
0	c
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2	d
3	3
4	e
5	b
6	f
7	7
8	8
9	9
a	1
b	5
c	0
d	2
e	4
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$\mathbf{u} \setminus \mathbf{v}$	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
0	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.
1	.	.	1	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	1	.	1	.	.	.
2	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.
3	.	.	.	1	.	1	.	.	1	1	1	.	.	1	.	.
4	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	.
5	.	1	1	1	.	.	1	.	.	1	1	1	.	.	1	.
6	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	1
7	.	1	.	.	1	1	1	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	1
8	.	.	.	.	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	1	.	.	.
9	.	1	1	.	1	.	.	.	.	1	1	.	1	.	.	.
a	.	.	.	.	.	1	.	.	1	1	.	.	.	1	.	.
b	.	1	.	1	1	.	.	.	1	.	1	.	.	1	.	.
c	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	1	.	1	.	.	.	1	.
d	.	.	.	1	.	.	1	.	.	.	1	1	.	.	1	.
e	.	1	.	1	1	.	.	1	1	.	.	1	.	.	.	1
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
$x$	$S(x)$			
0	c			
1	a	$(u_2 \vee \neg v_1 \vee \neg v_3)$	$\wedge (\neg u_1 \vee \neg v_0 \vee \neg v_1 \vee v_2)$	$\wedge (\neg u_0 \vee \neg u_1 \vee \neg u_2 \vee \neg v_2 \vee v_3)$
2	d	$\wedge (u_2 \vee u_3 \vee \neg v_3)$	$\wedge (\neg u_0 \vee \neg u_1 \vee \neg u_3 \vee v_2)$	$\wedge (\neg u_0 \vee \neg u_3 \vee v_0 \vee \neg v_1 \vee \neg v_3)$
3	3	$\wedge (u_1 \vee \neg v_1 \vee \neg v_2)$	$\wedge (\neg u_1 \vee u_2 \vee v_0 \vee v_2 \vee v_3)$	$\wedge (\neg u_0 \vee \neg u_1 \vee \neg u_3 \vee v_0 \vee v_1 \vee v_3)$
4	e	$\wedge (u_1 \vee u_3 \vee \neg v_2)$	$\wedge (u_2 \vee \neg u_3 \vee v_1 \vee v_2 \vee v_3)$	$\wedge (\neg u_0 \vee \neg u_2 \vee \neg u_3 \vee \neg v_0 \vee v_1 \vee \neg v_3)$
5	b	$\wedge (u_0 \vee \neg u_2 \vee u_3 \vee v_3)$	$\wedge (u_1 \vee \neg v_0 \vee \neg v_2 \vee \neg v_3)$	$\wedge (\neg u_1 \vee \neg u_2 \vee \neg u_3 \vee v_1 \vee \neg v_2)$
6	f			
7	7	$\wedge (u_0 \vee \neg u_1 \vee u_3 \vee v_2)$	$\wedge (\neg u_0 \vee u_1 \vee u_3 \vee v_0 \vee v_1)$	$\wedge (\neg u_1 \vee \neg u_2 \vee \neg u_3 \vee v_1 \vee v_3)$
8	8	$\wedge (\neg u_2 \vee v_0 \vee v_1 \vee v_3)$	$\wedge (\neg u_1 \vee u_3 \vee \neg v_0 \vee v_2 \vee \neg v_3)$	$\wedge (u_0 \vee u_1 \vee \neg u_3 \vee v_0 \vee v_1 \vee v_2)$
9	9	$\wedge (u_0 \vee u_1 \vee u_2 \vee \neg v_3)$	$\wedge (u_0 \vee u_1 \vee \neg u_2 \vee \neg v_1 \vee v_3)$	$\wedge (\neg u_3 \vee v_0 \vee \neg v_1 \vee \neg v_2 \vee \neg v_3)$
a	1			
b	5	$\wedge (u_1 \vee u_2 \vee \neg v_2 \vee \neg v_3)$	$\wedge (u_1 \vee \neg u_2 \vee u_3 \vee \neg v_1 \vee v_3)$	$\wedge (\neg u_0 \vee u_1 \vee u_2 \vee v_1 \vee v_2 \vee v_3)$
c	0	$\wedge (\neg u_2 \vee \neg v_0 \vee \neg v_1 \vee v_3)$	$\wedge (\neg u_1 \vee u_3 \vee \neg v_1 \vee v_2 \vee \neg v_3)$	
d	2			
e	4			
f	6			

# Application of Our Modeling to Integral Analysis of WARP



# WARP[Ban+20]

- ➡ Proposed in SAC 2020 [Ban+20] as the lightweight alternative of AES-128
- ➡ 128-bit block/key size, and 41 rounds (40.5 rounds)
- ➡ Splits 128-bit  $K$  into two halves  $K^{(0)}||K^{(1)}$  and uses  $K^{(r-1 \bmod 2)}$  in the  $r$ th round





# 22-round Integral Distinguisher for WARP

The best previous integral distinguisher: 20 rounds [Ban+20]


$$(2) \xrightarrow{22 \text{ rounds}} (\underline{20, 21, 22, 23}, 118, \underline{60, 61, 62, 63}),$$



# 22-round Integral Distinguisher for WARP


The best previous integral distinguisher: 20 rounds [Ban+20]

$$(2) \xrightarrow{22 \text{ rounds}} (\underline{20, 21, 22, 23}, 118, \underline{60, 61, 62, 63}),$$



## 23-round Integral Distinguisher for WARP

Any  $r$ -round integral distinguisher of WARP can be extended by 1 round




$$\sum_c X_4^{(22)} = \sum_c X_1^{(23)}$$

$$\sum_c X_{11}^{(22)} = \sum_c \left( S(X_4^{(23)}) \oplus X_0^{(23)} \right) \oplus \sum_c K_i^{(b)}$$

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


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# Key-Recovery




# Naive Approach v.s. FFT Technique [TA14]

🚗 Naive approach:

✔  $\sum \mathbf{x} = \sum_{c \in \mathbb{C}} f(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{c})$

✔  $T_{tot} = 2^{|\mathbf{k}|} |\mathbb{C}|$ , where  $\mathbb{C} = 2^{|\mathbf{k}|}$

✔  $T_{tot} = 2^{2|\mathbf{k}|}$




✈️ FFT technique:

✔  $\sum \mathbf{x} = \sum_{c \in \mathbb{C}} F(\mathbf{k} \oplus \mathbf{c})$

✔  $T_{tot} = 4 \cdot |\mathbf{k}| \cdot 2^{|\mathbf{k}|}$


# Naive Approach v.s. FFT Technique [TA14]

 Naive approach:

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

✔  $T_{tot} = 2^{|\mathbf{k}|} |\mathbb{C}|$ , where  $\mathbb{C} = 2^{|\mathbf{k}|}$

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 FFT technique:

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# MitM [SW12]



Naive approach:

✔  $x = F(k_1, k_2, c)$


✔  $T = 2^{|k_1 \cup k_2|}$



MitM:

✔  $y = F(k_1, c), z = g(k_2, c)$

✔  $T = 2^{|k_1|} + 2^{|k_2|}$



$$\sum x = 0$$

# MitM [SW12]



Naive approach:

✔  $x = F(k_1, k_2, c)$


✔  $T = 2^{|k_1 \cup k_2|}$



MitM:

✔  $y = F(k_1, c), z = g(k_2, c)$

✔  $T = 2^{|k_1|} + 2^{|k_2|}$




$$\sum x = 0 \iff \sum y = \sum z$$


# Overall View of Our Key-Recovery Tool

- 1- Assume that  $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{y} \oplus \mathbf{z}$  and  $\sum \mathbf{x} = 0$
- 2- For each path, i.e.,  $\mathbf{y}$ , and  $\mathbf{z}$ :
  - Build the graph of dependencies:  $\mathbf{y} = f(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{c})$
  - Simplify the dependency graph: reform  $f(\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{c})$  to  $F(\tilde{\mathbf{k}} \oplus \tilde{\mathbf{c}})$
  - Use FFT to compute the list  $[\sum \mathbf{y} \mid \tilde{\mathbf{k}} = 0, \dots, 2^{|\mathbf{k}|-1}]$
- 3- Compare the two lists to find candidates for the involved key bits
- 4- Brute force the remaining keys to find the correct key


# Example: 3-Round Key Recovery




# Example: 3-Round Key Recovery




# Example: Dependency Graph



# Example: Dependency Graph



# Example: Dependency Graph





## Summary of Our Result

#R	Data	Time	Memory	Attack	Reference
<b>32</b>	$2^{127}$	$2^{127}$	$2^{108}$	Integral	This paper
21	$2^{124}$	-	-	Integral	[Ban+20]
18	$2^{104.62}$	-	-	Differential	[TB22]
21	-	-	-	Impossible diff.	[Ban+20]
21	$2^{113}$	$2^{113}$	$2^{72}$	Differential	[KY21]
23	$2^{106.62}$	$2^{106.62}$	$2^{106.62}$	Differential	[TB22]
24	$2^{126.06}$	$2^{125.18}$	$2^{127.06}$	Rectangle	[TB22]

# Conclusion



# Contributions

- ✔ We provided a SAT model for integral analysis based on Monomial prediction
- ✔ Our modeling is generic and can be applied to other (binary field) block ciphers
- ✔ We proposed a tool for key-recovery taking the FFT technique into account
- 💎 Overall, we improved the integral attack of WARP by **11** rounds

Thanks for your attention!

<https://github.com/hadipourh/mpt>

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