TY - JOUR AU - De Meyer, Lauren AU - Bilgin, Begül AU - Reparaz, Oscar PY - 2019/05/09 Y2 - 2024/03/28 TI - Consolidating Security Notions in Hardware Masking JF - IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems JA - TCHES VL - 2019 IS - 3 SE - Articles DO - 10.13154/tches.v2019.i3.119-147 UR - https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8291 SP - 119-147 AB - <p>In this paper, we revisit the security conditions of masked hardware implementations. We describe a new, succinct, information-theoretic condition called <em>d</em>-glitch immunity which is both <em>necessary and sufficient</em> for security in the presence of glitches. We show that this single condition includes, but is not limited to, previous security notions such as those used in higher-order threshold implementations and in abstractions using ideal gates. As opposed to these previously known <em>necessary</em> conditions, our new condition is also <em>sufficient</em>. On the other hand, it excludes avoidable notions such as uniformity. We also treat the notion of (strong) noninterference from an information-theoretic point-of-view in order to unify the different security concepts and pave the way to the verification of composability in the presence of glitches. We conclude the paper by demonstrating how the condition can be used as an efficient and highly generic flaw detection mechanism for a variety of functions and schemes based on different operations.</p> ER -