@article{Batina_Chmielewski_Haase_Samwel_Schwabe_2022, title={SoK: SCA-secure ECC in software – mission impossible?}, volume={2023}, url={https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9962}, DOI={10.46586/tches.v2023.i1.557-589}, abstractNote={<p>This paper describes an ECC implementation computing the X25519 keyexchange protocol on the Arm Cortex-M4 microcontroller. For providing protections against various side-channel and fault attacks we first review known attacks and countermeasures, then we provide software implementations that come with extensive mitigations, and finally we present a preliminary side-channel evaluation. To our best knowledge, this is the first public software claiming affordable protection against multiple classes of attacks that are motivated by distinct real-world application scenarios. We distinguish between X25519 with ephemeral keys and X25519 with static keys and show that the overhead to our baseline unprotected implementation is about 37% and 243%, respectively. While this might seem to be a high price to pay for security, we also show that even our (most protected) static implementation is at least as efficient as widely-deployed ECC cryptographic libraries, which offer much less protection.</p>}, number={1}, journal={IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems}, author={Batina, Lejla and Chmielewski, Łukasz and Haase, Björn and Samwel, Niels and Schwabe, Peter}, year={2022}, month={Nov.}, pages={557–589} }