@article{Hicks_Garcia_Oswald_2018, title={Dismantling the AUT64 Automotive Cipher}, volume={2018}, url={https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/874}, DOI={10.13154/tches.v2018.i2.46-69}, abstractNote={<p>AUT64 is a 64-bit automotive block cipher with a 120-bit secret key used in a number of security sensitive applications such as vehicle immobilization and remote keyless entry systems. In this paper, we present for the first time full details of AUT64 including a complete specification and analysis of the block cipher, the associated authentication protocol, and its implementation in a widely-used vehicle immobiliser system that we have reverse engineered. Secondly, we reveal a number of cryptographic weaknesses in the block cipher design. Finally, we study the concrete use of AUT64 in a real immobiliser system, and pinpoint severe weaknesses in the key diversification scheme employed by the vehicle manufacturer. We present two key-recovery attacks based on the cryptographic weaknesses that, combined with the implementation flaws, break both the 8 and 24 round configurations of AUT64. Our attack on eight rounds requires only 512 plaintext-ciphertext pairs and, in the worst case, just 2<sup>37.3</sup> offline encryptions. In most cases, the attack can be executed within milliseconds on a standard laptop. Our attack on 24 rounds requires 2 plaintext-ciphertext pairs and 2<sup>48.3</sup> encryptions to recover the 120-bit secret key in the worst case. We have strong indications that a large part of the key is kept constant across vehicles, which would enable an attack using a single communication with the transponder and negligible offline computation.</p>}, number={2}, journal={IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems}, author={Hicks, Christopher and Garcia, Flavio D. and Oswald, David}, year={2018}, month={May}, pages={46–69} }