

The design of scalar AES Instruction Set Extensions for RISC-V

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Abstract. Secure, efficient execution of AES is an essential requirement on most computing platforms. Dedicated Instruction Set Extensions (ISEs) are often included for this purpose. RISC-V is a (relatively) new ISA that lacks such a standardised ISE. We survey the state-of-the-art industrial and academic ISEs for AES, implement and evaluate five different ISEs, one of which is novel. We recommend separate ISEs for 32 and 64-bit base architectures, with measured performance improvements for an AES-128 block encryption of $4\times$ and $10\times$ with a hardware cost of 1.1K and 8.2K gates respectively, when compared to a software-only implementation based on use of T-tables. We also explore how the proposed standard bit-manipulation extension to RISC-V can be harnessed for efficient implementation of AES-GCM. Our work supports the ongoing RISC-V cryptography extension standardisation process.

Keywords: ISE, AES, RISC-V

1 Introduction

Implementing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Compared to more general workloads, cryptographic algorithms like AES present a significant implementation challenge. They involve computationally intensive and specialised functionality, are used in a wide range of contexts, and form a central target in a complex attack surface. The demand for efficiency (however measured) is an example of this challenge in two ways. First, cryptography often represents an enabling technology vs. a feature and is often viewed as an overhead from a user’s perspective. Addressing this is complicated by constraints associated with the context, e.g., a demand for high-volume, low-latency, high-throughput, low-footprint, and/or low-power implementations. Second, although efficiency is a goal in itself, it *also* acts as an enabler for security. This is because one *should not* compromise security to meet efficiency requirements. Hence, a more efficient implementation leaves greater margin to deliver countermeasures against an attack.

AES is an interesting case-study wrt. secure, efficient implementation. For example, per the request for candidates announcement,¹ the AES process was instrumental in popularising a model in which *both* “security” (e.g., resilience against cryptanalytic attack) *and* “algorithm and implementation characteristics” form important quality metrics for the

¹<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1997-09-12/pdf/97-24214.pdf>

design, in order to facilitate techniques for higher quality *implementations* of it. Additionally, the design *and* implementations of AES are long-lived. The importance of AES has led to special emphasis on related research and development effort before, during, and, most significantly, after the AES process. The 20+ years since standardisation have forced an evolution of implementation techniques, to match changes in the technology and attack landscape. For example, [NBB⁺01, Section 3.6] covers implementation (e.g., side-channel) attacks: this field has become richer, and the associated threat more dangerous during said period.

Support via Instruction Set Extensions (ISEs). A large number of implementation styles often exist for a given cryptographic algorithm. Techniques can be algorithm-agnostic or algorithm-specific, and based on the use of hardware only, software only, or a hybrid approach using ISEs [GB11, BGM09, RI16]. For the ISE case, the aim is to identify through benchmarking, instances of algorithm-specific functionality which are inefficiently represented in the base ISA. Said functions are then implemented in hardware, and exposed to the programmer via one or more new instructions.

ISEs are an effective option for *both* high-end, performance-oriented and low-end, constrained platforms. They are particularly effective for the latter where resource constraints are tightest. For example, an ISE can be smaller and faster than a pure software implementation, and more efficient in terms of performance gain per additional logic gate than a hardware-only option.

Abstractly, an ISE design constitutes an *interface* to domain-specific functionality through the addition of instructions to a base ISA. As a fundamental and long-lived computer systems interface, the design and extension of an ISA demands careful consideration (cf. [Gue09, Section 4]) and the production of a concrete ISE design is not trivial. It must deliver a quantified improvement to the workload in question *and* consider numerous design goals including but not limited to:

- Limiting the number and complexity of changes and interactions with the parent ISA.
- Avoiding the addition of too many instructions, or requiring large additional hardware modules to implement: this will damage commercial adoption.
- Adhering to the design constraints and philosophies of the base ISA.
- Maximising the utility of the additional functionality, i.e., favour general-purpose over special-purpose functionality. Special-purpose functions can be justified in terms of how frequently the workload is required. For example, though an AES ISE might *only* be useful for AES, a webserver might execute AES millions of times per day.

The x86 architecture provides many examples of ISE design, having been extended numerous times by Intel and AMD. Various generations of non-cryptographic Multi-Media eXtensions (MMX), Streaming SIMD Extensions (SSE), and Advanced Vector Extensions (AVX) support numerical algorithms via vector (or SIMD) vs. scalar computation. Likewise, the cryptographic Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions (AES-NI) [Gue09, DGvK19] ISE supports AES: it significantly improves latency and throughput (see, e.g., [FHLdO18]), and represents a useful case-study in the design goals above. It adds just 6 additional (vs. 1500+ total) instructions, reduces overhead by sharing the pre-existing XMM register file, and facilitates compatibility via the CPUID [X8618a, Chapter 20] feature identification mechanism. It is also (sometimes unexpectedly) useful beyond AES: the Grøstl hash function [GKM⁺11] uses the S-box, and the YAES [BV14] authenticated encryption scheme uses a full round. It can even be used to accelerate the Chinese SM4 block cipher.²

²<https://github.com/mjosaarinen/sm4ni>

RISC-V. RISC-V is a (relatively) new ISA, with academic origins [AP14, Wat16]. Unlike x86 or ARMv8-A, RISC-V is a free-to-use open standard, managed by RISC-V International. The base ISA is extremely simple, consisting of only 50 instructions, and adopts *strongly* RISC-oriented design principles. RISC-V is also highly modular, having been *designed to be extended*. The general-purpose base ISA can (optionally) be supplemented using sets of special-purpose, standard or non-standard extensions to support additional functionality (e.g., floating-point, via the standard F [RV:19a, Section 11] and D [RV:19a, Section 12] extension), or satisfy specific optimisation goals (e.g., code density, via the standard C [RV:19a, Section 16] extension). RISC-V International delegates the development of extensions to a dedicated task group. The Cryptographic Extensions Task Group³ provides some specific context for this paper, through their remit to develop scalar and vector extensions to support cryptography.

RISC-V uses 32 registers, denoted $\text{GPR}[i]$ for $0 \leq i < 32$: $\text{GPR}[0]$ is fixed to 0, whereas $\text{GPR}[1]$ to $\text{GPR}[31]$ are general-purpose. XLEN is used to denote the width of each $\text{GPR}[i]$, and hence the base ISA. We focus on extending the RV32I [RV:19a, Section 2] and RV64I [RV:19a, Section 5], integer RISC-V base ISA and therefore focus on systems where $\text{XLEN} = 32$ or $\text{XLEN} = 64$.

Remit and organisation. In the context of an on-going effort to standardise cryptographic ISEs for RISC-V, this paper investigates support for AES. In specific terms, our contributions are as follows:

1. In Section 2 we capture some background, including a limited Systematisation of Knowledge (SoK) for AES ISEs.
2. In Section 3 we implement and evaluate five different ISEs for AES on two different RISC-V CPU cores. We explore existing ISE designs, and introduce what is, to the best of our knowledge, a novel ISE design in Section 3.5 that uses a quadrant-packed state representation.
3. In Section 4 we evaluate how the proposed standard bit-manipulation extension [RV:19a, Section 21] to RISC-V can be used to efficiently implement AES-GCM.

On the one hand, RISC-V represents an excellent target for such work: the ISA is extensible by design and its open nature makes exploration of extensions easier through the availability of (often open-source) implementations. Increased commercial deployment of such implementations suggests that work on RISC-V is timely and potentially of high impact. On the other hand, RISC-V also presents unique challenges vs. previous work. For example, RISC-V could in fact be viewed as *three* related base ISAs, RV32I [RV:19a, Section 2], RV64I [RV:19a, Section 5], and RV128I [RV:19a, Section 6], that each support a different word size: designing ISEs that are applicable (or scale) across these options is a complicating factor. We hope this work supports RISC-V in becoming the first widely implemented ISA to support AES acceleration across all implementation profiles, from embedded IoT devices to application and server class processors.

2 Background

2.1 AES specification

Syntax. As a block cipher, AES defines two algorithms

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ENC} & : \{0, 1\}^{8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nk} \times \{0, 1\}^{8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nb} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nb} \\ \text{DEC} & : \{0, 1\}^{8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nk} \times \{0, 1\}^{8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nb} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nb} \end{aligned}$$

³<https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-crypto-ext>

such that $m = \text{DEC}(k, c = \text{ENC}(k, m))$. That is, given a plaintext m and cipher key k , ENC encrypts m under k ; given the same k , DEC will invert ENC and so the *same* m can be recovered from the associated ciphertext c . In addition, it defines an algorithm KEYEXP that expands [FIP01, Section 5.2] the cipher key into a sequence of round keys then used by ENC or DEC ; where appropriate, we use

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ENC-KEYEXP} & : \{0, 1\}^{8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nk} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{(8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nb) \times (Nr+1)} \\ \text{DEC-KEYEXP} & : \{0, 1\}^{8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nk} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{(8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nb) \times (Nr+1)} \end{aligned}$$

to denote said algorithm as specialised to suit ENC and DEC respectively.

Parameterisation. An AES parameter set [FIP01, Figure 4] is a triple (Nk, Nb, Nr) where Nk dictates the number of 32-bit words in k , Nb dictates the number of 32-bit words in m or c (i.e., a block), and Nr dictates the number of rounds. The standard AES parameter sets are

$$\begin{aligned} \text{AES-128} & \mapsto (4, 4, 10) \\ \text{AES-192} & \mapsto (6, 4, 12) \\ \text{AES-256} & \mapsto (8, 4, 14) \end{aligned}$$

such that the number of bits in a plaintext (resp. ciphertext) block is fixed to $8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nb = 128$. From here on, we focus wlog. on encryption using AES-128 (other parameter sets are catered for naturally, and decryption with minor differences) so use the terms AES and AES-128 synonymously.

Design. The mathematics underpinning AES are described in [FIP01, Section 4]. In particular, it can be defined in terms of operations in the finite field \mathbb{F}_{2^8} constructed as $\mathbb{F}_2[\mathbf{x}]/(\mathbf{x}^8 + \mathbf{x}^4 + \mathbf{x}^3 + \mathbf{x} + 1)$. A hexadecimal short-hand [FIP01, Section 3.2] is used to represent field literals, e.g., $13 \mapsto 13_{(16)} \equiv 00010011_{(2)} \mapsto \mathbf{x}^4 + \mathbf{x} + 1$. Field addition, multiplication, and division are denoted by \oplus , \otimes , and \oslash respectively, with the multiplication-by- \mathbf{x} operation [FIP01, Section 4.2.1] denoted \mathbf{xtime} . Elements of \mathbb{F}_{2^8} are collected into (4×4) -element state and round key matrices; the i -th row and j -th column of such a matrix relating to round r is denoted $s_{i,j}^{(r)}$ and $rk_{i,j}^{(r)}$ respectively, with super- and/or subscripts omitted whenever irrelevant.

AES is an iterative block cipher, based on a substitution-permutation network. This means encryption using AES can be described [FIP01, Section 5.2] as follows: 1) the input plaintext is pre-whitened to yield $s^{(0)} = m \oplus rk^{(0)} = m \oplus k$, 2) each r -th round, for $1 \leq r \leq Nr$, demands computation of $s^{(r+1)} = \text{P-LAYER}(\text{S-LAYER}(s^{(r)})) \oplus rk^{(r)}$, and therefore use of round key $rk^{(r)}$, 3) the output ciphertext is $c = s^{(Nr)}$. Note that an alternative round definition, namely $s^{(r+1)} = \text{P-LAYER}(\text{S-LAYER}(s^{(r)} \oplus rk^{(r)}))$, is plausible: this shifts the pre-whitening step *before* 2) into an analogous post-whitening step *after* 2) to yield an equivalent result. At a low(er) level, the computation of each round is specified via four round functions (each of which has an inverse, to support decryption):

- **SubBytes** [FIP01, Section 5.1.1] operates element-wise, computing $s_{i,j}^{(r+1)} = \text{S-BOX}(s_{i,j}^{(r)})$ via application of the S-box: given an element x , this component can be described as

$$\text{S-BOX} : \begin{cases} \mathbb{F}_{2^8} & \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \\ x & \mapsto f(g(x)) \end{cases}$$

where g is an inversion, and f is a specially selected affine transformation. Where appropriate, we overload **SubBytes** by allowing it to denote application of the S-box to *any* collection, e.g., a row, column, or, more generally, a sequence, of elements.

- **ShiftRows** [FIP01, Section 5.1.2] operates row-wise, rotating each i -th row of $s^{(r)}$ by i elements to form the associated row of $s^{(r+1)}$, i.e., $s_{i,j}^{(r+1)} = s_{i,j+i \pmod{Nb}}^{(r)}$. Where

appropriate, we use `ShiftRow` to denote the operation applied to a single row within `ShiftRows`.

- `MixColumns` [FIP01, Section 5.1.3] operates column-wise, multiplying each j -th column of $s^{(r)}$ with a constant MDS matrix to form the associated column of $s^{(r+1)}$. Where appropriate, we use `MixColumn` to denote the operation applied to a single column within `MixColumns`, i.e., multiplication of a 4-element column vector by the constant MDS matrix.
- `AddRoundKey` [FIP01, Section 5.1.4] operates element-wise, computing $s_{i,j}^{(r+1)} = s_{i,j}^{(r)} \oplus rk_{i,j}^{(r)}$ and thereby mixing a round key into the state.

Note that `S-LAYER` = `SubBytes`, and

$$\text{P-LAYER} = \begin{cases} \text{MixColumns} \circ \text{ShiftRows} & \text{in rounds } 1 \leq r < Nr \\ \text{ShiftRows} & \text{in round } Nr \end{cases}$$

i.e., the last, Nr -th round differs from the initial $Nr - 1$ rounds. As such, a round as defined above is constructed via `AddRoundKey` \circ `MixColumns` \circ `ShiftRows` \circ `SubBytes` or `AddRoundKey` \circ `ShiftRows` \circ `SubBytes` respectively, where, because `ShiftRows` and `SubBytes` commute, the order they are applied in can be selected to suit.

2.2 AES implementation

2.2.1 Representation

A field element in \mathbb{F}_{2^8} can be represented by an 8-bit byte, where the i -th bit of x for $0 \leq i < 8$ represents the i -th polynomial coefficient.

Beyond this, the state and round key matrices can be represented in several ways. The most direct option would be termed array-based (or unpacked): the matrix is represented as a 16-element array of 8-bit bytes, each representing field elements. We use R to refer to the register width of a target platform. For RISC-V, $R = \text{XLEN}$ where we consider $\text{XLEN} \in \{32, 64\}$. Where $R \geq 32$, an entire row or column of the AES state matrix can be packed into each register: we term these “row-packed” and “column-packed” representations respectively. Where $R \geq 128$, it is plausible to pack an entire AES state matrix into a single register: we term this a “fully-packed” representation.

2.2.2 Hardware-only implementations

In a hardware-only implementation, execution of AES is performed by a dedicated hardware module (e.g., a memory-mapped co-processor). A large design space exists for hardware implementations of AES. Gaj and Chodowicz [GC00, Section 3.3] give an overview, detailing iterative, combinatorial (unrolled), and pipelined architectures. Similarly, [PMDW04, GB05, GC09] survey concrete implementations on a variety of fabrics including FPGAs and ASICs.

Although hardware-only designs are not our focus, the associated techniques can guide ISE-related design choices. First, they guide the ISE interface. For example, some ISEs can be characterised as offering an interface to hardware constituting one round (i.e., aligned with an iterative hardware implementation). Second, they guide the ISE implementation. For example, a significant body of work focuses on efficient hardware implementation of the S-box: [Can05, BP12, RMTA18].

2.2.3 Software-only implementations

In a software-only implementation, execution of AES and the associated application program is performed by a general-purpose processor core, using only instructions in the

base ISA. Since we only consider use of the RISC-V scalar base ISA, we exclude work on the use of vector-like extensions [Ham09].

Software-only techniques are important because many ISEs are evaluated against baseline ISA implementations. Work such as that of Bernstein and Schwabe [BS08], Osvik et al. [OBSC10], and Schwabe and Stoffelen [SS16] present and compare multiple techniques across a range of platforms, but, for completeness, we present a (limited) survey in what follows.

Compute-oriented. A compute-oriented implementation of AES favours online computation, thus reducing memory footprint at the cost of increased latency. Following [DR02, Section 4.1], for example, the idea is to simply 1) adopt an array-packed representation of state and round key matrices, then 2) construct a round implementation by following the algorithmic description of each round function in a direct manner. Addition in \mathbb{F}_{2^8} can be implemented with a base ISA XOR instruction. Base ISA support is rarely present for multiplication and inversion in \mathbb{F}_{2^8} however. Hence it is common to pre-compute the S-BOX and/or `xtime` functions. This requires pre-computation and storage of a 256 B look-up table per function, but significantly reduces execution latency.

On platforms where $R = 32$, Bertoni et al. [BBF⁺02] improve execution latency by exploiting the wider data-path. They adopt a row-packed representation of state and round key matrices, implementing `ShiftRows` using native rotation instructions to act on the packed rows. `MixColumns` is implemented using the SIMD Within A Register (SWAR) paradigm: applying `xtime` across a packed row in parallel.

Table-oriented. A table-oriented implementation of AES favours offline pre-computation, reducing latency but increasing the memory footprint. The main example of this technique is the so-called T-tables [DR02, Section 4.2] method. This involves adopting a column-packed representation of state and round key matrices and pre-computing `MixColumn` ◦ `SubBytes` using the tables

$$\begin{aligned}
 T_0[x] &= \begin{bmatrix} 02_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \\ 01_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \\ 01_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \\ 03_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \end{bmatrix} & T_1[x] &= \begin{bmatrix} 03_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \\ 02_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \\ 01_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \\ 01_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \end{bmatrix} \\
 T_2[x] &= \begin{bmatrix} 01_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \\ 03_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \\ 02_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \\ 01_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \end{bmatrix} & T_3[x] &= \begin{bmatrix} 01_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \\ 01_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \\ 03_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \\ 02_{(16)} \otimes \text{S-BOX}(x) \end{bmatrix}
 \end{aligned}$$

for $x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^8}$, then computing each j -th column of $s^{(r+1)}$ as

$$T_0[s_{i,j+i}^{(r)} \pmod{Nb}] \oplus T_1[s_{i,j+i}^{(r)} \pmod{Nb}] \oplus T_2[s_{i,j+i}^{(r)} \pmod{Nb}] \oplus T_3[s_{i,j+i}^{(r)} \pmod{Nb}]$$

where extraction of elements caters for `ShiftRows`, then XOR'ing the j -th column of $rk^{(r)}$ to cater for `AddRoundKey`.

As such, each round becomes a sequence of look-ups into T_i , plus XORs to combine their result. Doing so demands pre-computation and storage of a $256 \cdot 4 \text{ B} = 1 \text{ kB}$ look-up table per T_i . The overhead related to extraction of each element from packed columns representing $s^{(r)}$ (to form look-table offsets) can be significant: Fiskiran and Lee [FL01] analyse the impact of different addressing modes on this issue, with Stoffelen [Sto19, Section 3.1] concluding that RISC-V is ill-equipped to reduce said overhead, due to the provision of a sparse set of addressing modes. Further, in systems with data caches, T-table based implementations are susceptible to timing attacks [Ber05].

Bit-sliced. The term bit-slicing is an implementation technique due to Biham [Bih97], which constitutes

1. a non-standard *representation* of data where each R -bit word x is transformed into \hat{x} , i.e., R slices, say $\hat{x}[i]$ for $0 \leq i < R$, where $\hat{x}[i]_j = x_i$ for some j , and
2. a non-standard *implementation* of operation: each operation f used as $r = f(x)$ must be transformed into a “software circuit” \hat{f} , i.e., a sequence of Boolean instructions acting on the slices st. $\hat{r} = \hat{f}(\hat{x})$.

Bit-slicing introduces some overhead related to conversion of x into \hat{x} and \hat{r} into r , plus the (relative) inefficiency of \hat{f} vs. f wrt. latency and footprint. However, if each slice is itself an R -bit word, then it is possible to compute R instances of \hat{f} in *parallel* on suitably packed \hat{x} . A common analogy is that of transforming the R -bit, 1-way scalar processor into a 1-bit, R -way SIMD processor, thus giving (or recouping) up to a R -fold improvement in latency.

As evidenced by [MN07, KÖ8] and [KS09], the application of bit-slicing to AES can be very effective; Stoffelen [Sto19, Section 3.1] specifically investigates this fact within the context of RISC-V.

2.3 Existing AES ISEs

Here, we survey AES-related ISE designs split into 1) industry-specified ISEs, which are *standard* extensions, and 2) academia-specified ISEs, which are *non-standard* extensions, wrt. a given base ISA. Each ISE is classified as either workload-specific, if it is only useful for AES, or workload-agnostic, if it is useful for AES and other workloads. Note that we exclude work where an ISE for another workload can be applied *to* AES but was not designed *for* AES (see, e.g., Tillich and Großschädl [TG04] who apply an ISE intended for ECC to AES).

2.3.1 Standard, industry-specified ISEs

Intel introduced support for AES in x86 per [X8618a, Section 12.13]. Instructions use a destructive 2-address (1 source, 1 source/destination) or non-destructive 3-address (2 source, 1 destination) format depending on the variant (e.g., XMM- vs. AVX-based), and operate on data housed in the pre-existing vector register file, implying $R = 128$. AES is implemented by 1) adopting a fully-packed representation of state and round key matrices, then 2) using `AESENC` [X8618b, Page 3-54] to construct a round implementation as

$$\text{AESENC} \mapsto \text{AddRoundKey} \circ \text{MixColumns} \circ \text{SubBytes} \circ \text{ShiftRows}$$

IBM introduced support for AES in POWER per [POW18, Section 6.11.1]. Instructions use a non-destructive 3-register (2 source, 1 destination) format, and operate on data housed in the pre-existing vector register file, implying $R = 128$. AES is implemented by 1) adopting a fully-packed representation of state and round key matrices, then 2) using `vcipher` [POW18, Page 304] to construct a round implementation as

$$\text{vcipher} \mapsto \text{AddRoundKey} \circ \text{MixColumns} \circ \text{ShiftRows} \circ \text{SubBytes}$$

ARM introduced support for AES in ARMv8-A per [ARM20, Section A2.3]. Instructions use a destructive 2-address (1 source, 1 source/destination) format, and operate on data housed in the pre-existing vector register file, implying $R = 128$. AES is implemented by 1) adopting a fully-packed representation of state and round key matrices, then 2) using `AESE` [ARM20, Section C7.2.8] and `AESMC` [ARM20, Section C7.2.10] to construct a round implementation as

$$\text{AESMC} \circ \text{AESE} \mapsto \text{MixColumns} \circ (\text{SubBytes} \circ \text{ShiftRows} \circ \text{AddRoundKey}),$$

Oracle introduced support for AES in SPARC per [SPA16, Sections 7.3+7.4]. Instructions use a non-destructive 4-address (3 source, 1 destination) format, and operate on data housed in the pre-existing general-purpose register file, implying $R = 64$. AES is implemented by 1) using a column-packed representation of state and round key matrices, then 2) using AES_EROUND01 [SPA16, Page 109] and AES_EROUND23 [SPA16, Page 109] to construct a round implementation as

$$(\text{AES_EROUND01}; \text{AES_EROUND23}) \mapsto \text{AddRoundKey} \circ \text{MixColumns} \circ \text{ShiftRows} \circ \text{SubBytes}$$

in two steps: the first step processes columns 0 and 1 via AES_EROUND01 whereas the second step processes columns 2 and 3 via AES_EROUND23.

2.3.2 Non-standard, academia-specified ISEs

Burke et al. [BMA00] propose a workload-agnostic ISE based on workload characterisation for the DEC Alpha architecture [C+14]. Per [BMA00], pertinent examples for AES include a) ROL and ROR, which perform left- and right-rotate, and b) SBOX, which extracts elements to form look-up table offsets. In one configuration, the resulting memory accesses are supported by a set of special-purpose “S-box caches”.

Fiskiran and Lee [FL05] propose a workload-agnostic ISE that employs a so-called Parallel Table Lookup Module (PTLU) for a “RISC like” instruction set. For AES, this accelerates implementations based on T-tables by affording an addressing mode that a) integrates extraction of elements to form look-up table offsets, and b) performs the associated table look-ups in parallel, supported by a dedicated scratch-pad memory.

Biham et al. [BAK98, Page 232] propose (in theory) and Grabher et al. [GGP08] explore (in practice) a workload-agnostic ISE that supports bit-sliced implementations for their custom CRISP (“RISC like”) architecture. The ISE allows computation using *configurable* 4-input, 2-output Boolean functions, vs. *fixed* 2-input, 1-output alternatives such as NOT, AND, OR, and XOR. Sequences of native Boolean instructions, which dominate bit-sliced implementations, can thereby be “compressed” into use of the ISE. Doing so improves both latency and footprint. [GGP08, Section 4] details the application to AES.

Nadehara et al. [NIK04] propose a workload-specific ISE that could be described as “hardware-assisted T-tables”: observing that $\forall x, i \neq j, T_i[x]$ is a rotation of $T_j[x]$, they support on-the-fly computation (vs. via look-up) of T-table entries. The ISE constitutes a single instruction $\text{AESENC} \mapsto T_i$, supported by a dedicated hardware module (see [NIK04, Figure 6]). Instances of AESENC 1) extract an input element from a packed input column 2) use the input to compute an output element equivalent to a look-up from the T-table, and 3) store the output element into a packed output column. This approach was reapplied by Saarinen [Saa20] within the context of RISC-V.

Tillich et al. [TGS05] propose a workload-specific ISE that could be described as “hardware-assisted S-box” for the SPARC V8 architecture. The ISE constitutes a single instruction $\text{sbox} \mapsto \text{SubBytes}$, supported by a dedicated hardware module (see [TGS05, Figure 1]). Instances of sbox 1) extract an input element from a packed input row or column, 2) use the input to compute an output element equivalent to a look-up from the S-box, and 3) insert the output element into a packed output row or column. Using insert vs. overwrite semantics allows ShiftRows to be computed *for free*.

Bertoni et al. [BBFR06] propose a workload-specific ISE that could be described as “hardware-assisted round functions”. The ISE includes 1) zero-overhead rotation (similar to ARM), and 2) byte- and word-oriented variants of $\text{SMix} \mapsto \text{MixColumn} \circ \text{SubBytes}$.

Tillich and Großschädl [TG06] propose a workload-specific ISE that could be described as “hardware-assisted round functions” for the SPARC V8 architecture. The ISE includes byte- and word-oriented variants of $\text{sbox}[4][s|r] \mapsto \text{SubBytes}$ and $\text{mixcol}[4][s] \mapsto$

MixColumn; per [TG06, Section 4.3], the most efficient variant allows a zero-overhead implementation of ShiftRows to be realised.

2.4 Security

While the security of AES against a cryptanalytic attack is defined by the design, and so is out of scope, *implementation* attacks are of central importance. An implementation attack focuses on the concrete instance of a construct rather than the abstract specification. Countermeasures against such attacks must therefore be considered alongside implementations they relate to. Since AES is an important target, a significant body of literature exists around implementation attacks on it, including both active (e.g., fault injection) or passive (i.e., side-channel monitoring) attack techniques. The latter can be sub-divided into those dependent on analogue (power-based [MOP07]) or discrete (time-based [KQ99]) leakage.

Use of ISEs *can* provide some inherent protection against certain attacks. For example, ISEs typically yield constant time execution, preventing some classes of timing or micro-architectural attack techniques (see [Sze19, Section 4] and [GYCH18, Section 4]). Unfortunately, use of ISEs also presents some unique challenges. For example, Saab et al. [SRH16] discuss power-based attacks on AES-NI; concluding that naive use of AES-NI yields exploitable information leakage. Mitigation of such leakage demands the ISE address instances where the leakage stems from “inside” the ISE, and work with appropriate countermeasures (e.g., hiding [MOP07, Chapter 7] or masking [MOP07, Chapter 10]). Tillich et al. [THM07] consider this problem to an extent, including an ISE-based option in their investigation of hardened AES implementations. However, the challenge of developing suitable ISEs is under-studied in general.

3 Exploring AES ISEs for RISC-V

Section 2.3 outlined a range of ISE designs, demonstrating a large design space of options that we *could* consider. To narrow the design space into those we *do* consider, we use the requirements outlined below:

Requirement 1. *The ISE must support 1) AES encryption and decryption, and 2) all parameter sets, i.e., AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256. Support for auxiliary operations, e.g., key schedule, is an advantage but not a requirement.*

Requirement 2. *The ISE must align with the wider RISC-V design principles. This means it should favour simple building-block operations, and use instruction encodings with at most 2 source registers and 1 destination register. This avoids the cost of a general-purpose register file with more than 2 read ports or 1 write port.*

Requirement 3. *The ISE must use the RISC-V general-purpose scalar register file to store operands and results, rather than any vector register file. This requirement excludes the majority of standard ISEs outlined in Section 2.3.*

Requirement 4. *The ISE must not introduce special-purpose architectural state, nor rely on special-purpose micro-architectural state (e.g., caches or scratch-pad memory).*

Requirement 5. *The ISE must enable data-oblivious execution of AES, preventing timing attacks based on execution latency (e.g., stemming from accesses to a pre-computed S-box).*

Requirement 6. *The ISE must be efficient, in terms of improvement in execution latency per area required: this balances the value in both metrics vs. an exclusive preference for one or the other. Efficiency wrt. auxiliary metrics, e.g., memory footprint or instruction encoding points, is an advantage but not a requirement.*

Overall, the requirements combine to intentionally target the ISE at low(er)-end, resource-constrained (e.g., embedded) platforms. We view such a focus as reasonable, because existing work on adding cryptographic support to the standard vector extension [RV:19a, Section 21] already caters for high(er)-end alternatives.

We arrive at five ISE variants using the requirements, the description of which is split into an intuitive description in the following Sections and a technical description (e.g., a list of instructions and their semantics) in an associated Appendix.

3.1 Variant 1 (\mathcal{V}_1): SubBytes + MixColumn + explicit ShiftRows

By reproducing [TG06, Section 4.2], \mathcal{V}_1 assumes $XLEN = 32$ and adopts a column-packed representation of state and round key matrices. As detailed in Figure 2, \mathcal{V}_1 adds 4 instructions (2 for encryption, 2 for decryption). For example, `saes.v1.encs` applies SubBytes to elements in a packed column, and `saes.v1.encm` applies MixColumn to a packed column; the instruction format for `saes.v1.encs` and `saes.v1.encm` specifies 1 source and 1 destination register. Since `saes.v1.encs` requires 4 applications of the S-box, a trade-off between latency and area is possible st. n physical S-box instances are (re)used in $4/n$ cycles (e.g., 1 instance in 4 cycles, or 4 instances in 1 cycle).

Figure 7 demonstrates that use of \mathcal{V}_1 to implement AES encryption requires 47 instructions per round: 4 `lw` instructions to load the round key, 4 `xor` instructions to apply AddRoundKey, 4 `saes.v1.encs` instructions to apply SubBytes, 31 instructions to apply ShiftRows, and 4 `saes.v1.encm` instructions to apply MixColumns.

3.2 Variant 2 (\mathcal{V}_2): SubBytes + MixColumn + implicit ShiftRows

By reproducing [TG06, Section 4.3], \mathcal{V}_2 assumes $XLEN = 32$ and adopts a column-packed representation of state and round key matrices. As detailed in Figure 3, \mathcal{V}_2 adds 4 instructions (2 for encryption, 2 for decryption). For example, `saes.v2.encs` applies SubBytes to elements in a packed column, and `saes.v2.encm` applies MixColumn to a packed column; the instruction format for `saes.v2.encs` and `saes.v2.encm` specifies 2 source and 1 destination register. \mathcal{V}_2 improves \mathcal{V}_1 by applying ShiftRows *implicitly*: this is possible by careful indexing of elements in source and destination columns during application of SubBytes and MixColumns, and also permits `saes.v2.encs` to be used within the key schedule. The same trade-off is possible as in \mathcal{V}_1 , whereby n physical S-box instances are (re)used in $4/n$ cycles (e.g., 1 instance in 4 cycles, or 4 instances in 1 cycle).

Figure 8 demonstrates that use of \mathcal{V}_2 to implement AES encryption requires 16 instructions per round: 4 `lw` instructions to load the round key, 4 `xor` instructions to apply AddRoundKey, 4 `saes.v1.encs` instructions to apply SubBytes, and 4 `saes.v1.encm` instructions to apply MixColumns. In the Nr -th round, which omits MixColumns, ShiftRows must be applied *explicitly* using an additional 12 instructions.

3.3 Variant 3 (\mathcal{V}_3): hardware-assisted T-tables

\mathcal{V}_3 is based on [NIK04, BBFR06, Saa20]; it assumes $XLEN = 32$ and adopts a column-packed representation of state and round key matrices.

As detailed in Figure 4, \mathcal{V}_3 adds 4 instructions (2 for encryption, 2 for decryption). The basic idea is to support an implementation strategy aligned with use of T-tables [DR02, Section 4.2], but compute entries in hardware vs. storing the look-up entries in memory. For example, `saes.v3.enesm` extracts an element from a packed column, applies SubBytes to the element, expands the element into a packed column, applies MixColumn, then applies AddRoundKey. The inclusion of AddRoundKey follows [Saa20], which improves on [NIK04, BBFR06]; as a result of this, the instruction format for `saes.v3.enesm` specifies 2 source and 1 destination register. The requirement for 1 application of the

S-box allows for a more efficient functional unit than \mathcal{V}_1 or \mathcal{V}_2 , for example, either wrt. latency or area.

Figure 9 demonstrates that use of \mathcal{V}_3 to implement AES encryption requires 20 instructions per round: 4 `lw` instructions to load the round key, and 16 `saes.v3.encsm` instructions to apply `SubBytes`, `ShiftRows`, `MixColumns`, and `AddRoundKey`. In the Nr -th round, which omits `MixColumns`, `saes.v3.encsm` is replaced by `saes.v3.encs`.

3.4 Variant 4 (\mathcal{V}_4): 64-bit data-path

\mathcal{V}_4 requires $XLEN = 64$ and adopts a *double* column-packed representation of state and round key matrices, i.e., *two* columns (or 8 elements) are packed into a 64-bit word. It is similar in principle to the SPARC [SPA16, Page 109] ISE, but improves on it by adhering to the 2 source and 1 destination register format. By sourcing two 64-bit registers, and writing a single 64-bit register, a single instruction can accept all of the current round state as input and produce half of the next round state as output.

SPARC [SPA16, Page 109] adds 9 instructions (4 for encryption, 4 for decryption, and 1 auxiliary). For example, `AES_EROUND01` and `AES_EROUND23` produce columns 0 and 1 and columns 2 and 3 respectively. Each instruction sources 3 64-bit registers, and writes a single 64-bit register. As shown in Figure 5, \mathcal{V}_4 improves this by adding only 7 instructions (2 for encryption, 2 for decryption, and 3 auxiliary). This is realised by utilising the Equivalent Inverse Cipher representation detailed in [FIP01, Section 5.3.5]. This enables all of the round transformations to be applied in the same order for both encryption and decryption. The `AddRoundKey` step can then be lifted out of the round function instructions (where otherwise it would appear in the middle of the decryption round), and implemented using a base ISA `xor` instruction. The round key then no longer needs to be an input to the instruction, meaning it only needs 2 source register operands. We then note that the nature of `ShiftRows` means we do not need separate instructions to compute the next values of columns (0,1) or columns (2,3) as the SPARC instructions do. Instead, we can simply reverse the order of the source register operands, and get the same effect. This is detailed in Figure 5, and an example round function is shown in Figure 10.

For example, `saes.v4.encsm rd, rA, rB` applies `SubBytes`, `ShiftRow`, and `MixColumn` to elements in a packed column and produces the *next* round values for packed columns (0,1). Executing `saes.v4.encsm rd, rB, rA`, with no change in values of `rA` or `rB`, will produce the next round state values for packed columns (2, 3).

Figure 10 demonstrates that use of \mathcal{V}_4 to implement AES encryption requires 6 instructions per round: 2 `ld` instructions to load the round key, 2 `xor` instructions to apply `AddRoundKey`, 2 `saes.v4.encsm` instructions to apply `SubBytes`, `ShiftRows`, and `MixColumns`. In the Nr -th round, which omits `MixColumns`, `saes.v4.encsm` is replaced by `saes.v4.encs`. Note that use of the Equivalent Inverse Cipher representation necessitates inclusion of the `saes.v4.imix` instruction, in order to efficiently imply the inverse `MixColumn` step to words of the Key-Schedule.

3.5 Variant 5 (\mathcal{V}_5): quadrant-packed

\mathcal{V}_5 assumes $XLEN = 32$ and adopts a novel, *quadrant*-packed representation of state and round key matrices as shown in Figure 1. This means that each quadrant of the standard 4×4 byte AES state representation is packed into a single 32-bit register word. This allows *either* two complete rows (to perform `ShiftRows`) *or* two complete columns (to perform `MixColumns`) of the state can be accessed by accessing two quadrants. Based on this, such a representation can 1) afford advantages of *both* row- and column-packed alternatives, *and* 2) allow an instruction format that meets the 2 source and 1 destination register address constraint of a RISC-V pipeline. However, it also requires conversion of any input and output data between *quadrant*-packed and standard *column*-packed representation.

Although such conversion is amortised by Nr rounds of computation, it still represents an overhead vs. other variants.

As detailed in Figure 6, \mathcal{V}_5 adds 7 instructions (3 for encryption, 3 for decryption, and 1 auxiliary). Taking encryption as an example, we define two instructions to perform the `ShiftRows` and `SubBytes` steps. `saes.v5.esrsub.lo` performs `ShiftRows` and `SubBytes` on the two *bottom* quadrants, and `saes.v5.esrsub.hi` does the same for the two *top* quadrants. The two instructions are necessary to account for the different rotation amounts applied to the top and bottom rows as part of `ShiftRows`. A single instruction `saes.v5.emix` applies the `MixColumns` transformation to two columns. The instruction can source two entire column owing to the quadrant packed representation, but can only write a single quadrant back. Hence, two executions of the same instruction are needed to apply the entire `MixColumns` step to each two quadrants.

Figure 11 demonstrates that use of \mathcal{V}_5 to implement AES encryption requires 16 instructions per round: 4 `lw` instructions to load the round key, 4 `xor` instructions to apply `AddRoundKey`, 4 `saes.v5.esrsub.[lo|hi]` instructions to apply `SubBytes` and `ShiftRows`, and 4 `saes.v5.emix` instructions to apply `MixColumns`. Note that conversion into (resp. from) quadrant-packed representation requires a further 12 instructions; this can be reduced to 4 `pack[h]` instructions using the standard bit-manipulation extension [RV:19a, Section 17].

\mathcal{V}_5 instructions may be implemented with between 1 and 4 SBox instances, with a corresponding tradeoff between area and latency. As with \mathcal{V}_1 and \mathcal{V}_2 however, additional storage elements are required if fewer than 4 SBoxes are instanced in order to store intermediate results. The auxiliary `saes.v5.sub` instruction is used during the Key-Schedule, and can act simply as an interface to the SBoxes already required by the round instructions.

3.6 Implementation

The evaluation of each ISE considers two different RISC-V compliant base micro-architectures, which constitute two different host cores:

- The SCARV⁴ core supports the RV32IMC instruction set, i.e., the 32-bit [RV:19a, Section 2] base integer ISA plus standard Multiplication [RV:19a, Section 7] and Compressed [RV:19a, Section 16] extensions. Per the block diagram shown in Figure 12, the core executes instructions using a 5-stage, in-order pipeline. No branch prediction is supported. There are two memory interfaces for instruction fetch and data memory accesses. No instruction or data caches are supported. The core implements various performance counters, and elements of the RISC-V Privileged Resource Architecture (PRA) [RV:19b, Chapter 3] related to exception and interrupt handling.
- The Rocket [AAB⁺16] core executes instructions using a 5-stage, in-order pipeline which is highly configurable. We take advantage of this, considering two variants whose exact configuration is outlined in Figure 13 and Figure 14: the variants represent single 32-bit and 64-bit cores respectively, and so support the RV32IMC (resp. RV64IMC) instruction set, i.e., the 32-bit [RV:19a, Section 2] (resp. 64-bit [RV:19a, Section 5]) base integer ISA plus standard Multiplication [RV:19a, Section 7] and Compressed [RV:19a, Section 16] extensions. Each variant is configured to support an instruction cache, a data cache, and a branch prediction mechanism, but no floating-point support.

To support each ISE, two modifications were made to each host core: the instruction decoder was modified to support operand selection and an AES Functional Unit (AES-FU) was added to support execution of ISE instructions. The SCARV core integrates the AES-FU directly into the pipeline, while the Rocket core accesses the AES-FU via the

⁴<https://github.com/scarv/scarv>




Figure 1: An illustration of quadrant-packed representation (left), as applied to a state matrix (right).

```

1 saes.v1.encs rd, rs1 : v1.SubBytes(rd, rs1, fwd=1)
2 saes.v1.decs rd, rs1 : v1.SubBytes(rd, rs1, fwd=0)
3 saes.v1.encm rd, rs1 : v1.MixColumn(rd, rs1, fwd=1)
4 saes.v1.decm rd, rs1 : v1.MixColumn(rd, rs1, fwd=0)
5
6 v1.SubByte(rd, rs1, fwd):
7     rd.8[i] = AESBox[rs1.8[i]] if fwd else AESInvBox[rs1.8[i]] for i=0..3
8
9 v1.MixColumn(rd, rs1, fwd):
10     for i=0..3:
11         tmp.32 = ROTL32(rs1.32, 8*i)
12         rd.8[i] = AESMixColumn(tmp.32) if fwd else AESInvMixColumn(tmp.32)

```

Figure 2: Instruction mnemonics, and their mapping onto pseudo-code functions, for \mathcal{V}_1 .

```

1 saes.v2.encs rd, rs1, rs2 : v2.SubBytes(rd, rs1, rs2, fwd=1)
2 saes.v2.decs rd, rs1, rs2 : v2.SubBytes(rd, rs1, rs2, fwd=0)
3 saes.v2.encm rd, rs1, rs2 : v2.MixColumns(rd, rs1, rs2, fwd=1)
4 saes.v2.decm rd, rs1, rs2 : v2.MixColumns(rd, rs1, rs2, fwd=0)
5
6 v2.SubBytes(rd, rs1, rs2, fwd):
7     t1.32 = {rs1.8[0], rs2.8[1], rs1.8[2], rs2.8[3]}
8     rd.8[i] = AESBox[t1.8[i]] if fwd else AESInvBox[t1.8[i]] for i=0..3
9
10 v2.MixColumns(rd, rs1, rs2, fwd):
11     t1.32 = {rs1.8[0], rs1.8[1], rs2.8[2], rs2.8[3]}
12     for i=0..3:
13         tmp.32 = ROTL32(rs1.32, 8*i)
14         rd.8[i] = AESMixColumn(tmp.32) if fwd else AESInvMixColumn(tmp.32)

```

Figure 3: Instruction mnemonics, and their mapping onto pseudo-code functions, for \mathcal{V}_2 .

```

1 saes.v3.encs rd, rs1, rs2, bs : v3.Proc(rd, rs1, rs2, bs, fwd=1, mix=0)
2 saes.v3.encsm rd, rs1, rs2, bs : v3.Proc(rd, rs1, rs2, bs, fwd=1, mix=1)
3 saes.v3.decs rd, rs1, rs2, bs : v3.Proc(rd, rs1, rs2, bs, fwd=0, mix=0)
4 saes.v3.decsm rd, rs1, rs2, bs : v3.Proc(rd, rs1, rs2, bs, fwd=0, mix=1)
5
6 v3.Proc(rd, rs1, rs2, bs, fwd, mix):
7     x = AESBox[rs2.8[bs]] if fwd else AESInvBox[rs2.8[bs]]
8     if mix and fwd: t1.32 = {GFMUL(x, 3), x, x, GFMUL(x, 2)}
9     elif mix and !fwd: t1.32 = {GFMUL(x, 11), GFMUL(x, 13), GFMUL(x, 9), GFMUL(x, 14)}
10    else : t1.32 = {0, 0, 0, x}
11    rd.32 = ROTL32(t1.32, 8*bs) ^ rs1

```

Figure 4: Instruction mnemonics, and their mapping onto pseudo-code functions, for \mathcal{V}_3 .

```

1  saes.v4.ks1      rd rs1 rcon : v4.ks1(rd, rs1, rcon)
2  saes.v4.ks2      rd rs1 rs2 : v4.ks2(rd, rs1, rs2 )
3  saes.v4.imix     rd rs1      : v4.InvMix(rd, rs1)
4  saes.v4.encsm    rd rs1 rs2 : v4.Enc(rd, rs1, rs2, mix=1)
5  saes.v4.encs     rd rs1 rs2 : v4.Enc(rd, rs1, rs2, mix=0)
6  saes.v4.decsm    rd rs1 rs2 : v4.Dec(rd, rs1, rs2, mix=1)
7  saes.v4.decs     rd rs1 rs2 : v4.Dec(rd, rs1, rs2, mix=0)
8
9  v4.ks1(rd, rs1, enc_rcon):      // KeySchedule: SubBytes, Rotate, Round Const
10     temp.32 = rs1.32[1]
11     rcon    = 0xA
12     if(enc_rcon != 0xA):
13         temp.32 = ROTR32(temp.32, 8)
14         rcon    = RoundConstants.8[enc_rcon]
15     temp.8[i] = AESBox[temp.8[i]] for i=0..3
16     temp.8[0] = temp.8[0] ^ rcon
17     rd.64    = {temp.32, temp.32}
18
19  v4.ks2(rd, rs1, rs2):          // KeySchedule: XOR
20     rd.32[0] = rs1.32[1] ^ rs2.32[0]
21     rd.32[1] = rs1.32[1] ^ rs2.32[0] ^ rs2.32[1]
22
23  v4.Enc(rd, rs1, rs2, mix):     // SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns
24     t1.128 = ShiftRows({rs2, rs1})
25     t2.64  = t1.64[0]
26     t3.8[i] = AESBox[t2.8[i]] for i=0..7
27     rd.32[i] = AESMixColumn(t3.32[i]) if mix else t3.32[i] for i=0..1
28
29  v4.Dec(rd, rs1, rs2, mix, hi): // InvSubBytes, InvShiftRows, InvMixColumns
30     t1.128 = InvShiftRows(rs2 || rs1)
31     t2.64  = t1.64[0]
32     t3.8[i] = AESInvBox[t2.8[i]] for i=0..7
33     rd.32[i] = AESInvMixColumn(t3.32[i]) if mix else t3.32[i] for i=0..1
34
35  v4.InvMix(rd, rs1):           // Inverse MixColumns
36     rd.32[i] = AESInvMixColumn(rs1.32[i]) for i=0..1

```

Figure 5: Instruction mnemonics, and their mapping onto pseudo-code functions, for \mathcal{V}_4 .

```

1  saes.v5.esrsub.lo rd, rs1, rs2 : rd = v5.SrSub(rs1, rs2, fwd=1, hi=0)
2  saes.v5.esrsub.hi rd, rs1, rs2 : rd = v5.SrSub(rs1, rs2, fwd=1, hi=1)
3  saes.v5.dsrsub.lo rd, rs1, rs2 : rd = v5.SrSub(rs1, rs2, fwd=0, hi=0)
4  saes.v5.dsrsub.hi rd, rs1, rs2 : rd = v5.SrSub(rs1, rs2, fwd=0, hi=1)
5  saes.v5.emix     rd, rs1, rs2 : rd = v5.Mix(rs1, rs2, fwd=1)
6  saes.v5.dmix     rd, rs1, rs2 : rd = v5.Mix(rs1, rs2, fwd=0)
7  saes.v5.sub      rd, rs1      : rd = SubBytes(rs1.8[i])          for i=0..3
8
9  v5.SrSub(rd, rs1, rs2, fwd, hi):
10     if(fwd):
11         if hi: tmp.32 = {rs1.8[3], rs2.8[0], rs2.8[1], rs2.8[2]}
12         else : tmp.32 = {rs2.8[3], rs1.8[1], rs1.8[0], rs1.8[2]}
13         tmp.8[i] = AESBox[tmp.8[i]] for i=0..3
14     else:
15         if hi: tmp.32 = {rs2.8[3], rs2.8[0], rs1.8[1], rs2.8[2]}
16         else : tmp.32 = {rs1.8[3], rs2.8[1], rs1.8[0], rs1.8[2]}
17         tmp.8[i] = InvAESBox[tmp.8[i]] for i=0..3
18     if(hi): rd.32 = {tmp.8[2], tmp.8[3], tmp.8[0], tmp.8[1]}
19     else : rd.32 = {tmp.8[1], tmp.8[3], tmp.8[0], tmp.8[2]}
20
21  v5.mix(rd, rs1, rs2, fwd):
22     col0.32 = {rs1.8[2], rs1.8[3], rs2.8[2], rs2.8[3]}
23     col1.32 = {rs1.8[0], rs1.8[1], rs2.8[0], rs2.8[1]}
24     n0.8 = AESMixColumn(col0) if fwd else AESInvMixColumn(col0)
25     n1.8 = AESMixColumn(ROTL32(col0, 8)) if fwd else AESInvMixColumn(ROTL32(col0, 8))
26     n2.8 = AESMixColumn(col1) if fwd else AESInvMixColumn(col1)
27     n3.8 = AESMixColumn(ROTL32(col1, 8)) if fwd else AESInvMixColumn(ROTL32(col1, 8))
28     rd.32 = {n2, n3, n0, n1}

```

Figure 6: Instruction mnemonics, and their mapping onto pseudo-code functions, for \mathcal{V}_5 .

Rocket Custom Coprocessor (RoCC) [AAB⁺16, Section 4] interface. Since Requirement 2 (each instruction uses at most 2 source and 1 destination register) is fulfilled, neither micro-architecture required further structural alteration. A synthesis-time parameter was used to switch between different ISEs.

3.7 Evaluation

Hardware. Each ISE variant was integrated into the two host cores described in Section 3.6. The variants which assume $XLEN = 32$ (\mathcal{V}_1 , \mathcal{V}_2 , \mathcal{V}_3 , and \mathcal{V}_5) were evaluated on *both* the 32-bit SCARV core *and* the 32-bit Rocket core; the variant which assumes $XLEN = 64$ (\mathcal{V}_4) was evaluated on *only* the 64-bit Rocket core. For \mathcal{V}_1 , \mathcal{V}_2 and \mathcal{V}_5 a trade-off between latency and area exists. Each such case is considered through two optimisation goals: the (A)rea goal instantiates 1 S-box and has a n -cycle execution latency, whereas the (L)atency goal instantiates 4 S-boxes and has a 1-cycle execution latency. We focus on ASIC implementations (rather than FPGA implementations) because this is the more relevant metric to the industrial (rather than academic) RISC-V community.

Table 1 shows the separated cost of the standalone ISE logic and the combined cost of the core and integrated ISE. Numbers highlighted in **bold** are the best result for each metric. The *Baseline* rows indicate the metrics for the the *unmodified* host CPU cores. We use the open source Yosys [Wol] synthesis tool (v0.9+1706) with default settings to provide post-synthesis (as opposed to post-layout) circuit area in the form of NAND2 gate equivalents (ISE Area, Tables 1 and 8) and circuit depths in the form of gate delays (ISE Latency, Tables 1 and 8). While more abstract than providing exact area and frequency results for a particular ASIC standard cell library, it is much easier to reproduce⁵ while still providing meaningful results. This methodology has also been used for other RISC-V standard extension proposals, namely the bit-manipulation extension [ris, Section 3.1, Page 54]. We found that none of the ISEs affected the critical gate delay path of either the SCARV or Rocket core. These were 97 for the 32-bit SCARV core and 231 and 167 for the 32 and 64-bit Rocket core respectively⁶. Considering each ISE as implemented on the Rocket core, we note the overhead wrt. area is marginal: this stems from the fact that the baseline area of Rocket includes the data and instruction caches.

In Table 8 we consider the hardware costs when only *encryption* instructions are implemented. This is relevant to systems which only care about certain block cipher modes of operation, such as Galos/Counter-mode. We discuss this further in Section 4.

Software. We evaluated each ISE variant by implementing the AES-128 ENC, DEC *plus* ENC-KEYEXP and DEC-KEYEXP. We use our own implementation of a *non*-ISE T-table based implementation as a baseline. The variants which assume $XLEN = 32$ (\mathcal{V}_1 , \mathcal{V}_2 , \mathcal{V}_3 , and \mathcal{V}_5) used a rolled strategy wrt. loops: \mathcal{V}_1 , \mathcal{V}_2 , and \mathcal{V}_5 used 1 round per iteration, whereas \mathcal{V}_3 used 2 rounds per iteration to avoid needless register move operations. The variant which assumes $XLEN = 64$ (\mathcal{V}_4) used an unrolled strategy. In all cases the state is naturally aligned,⁷ meaning any input (resp. output) can be loaded (resp. stored) using 4 `lw` instructions on a 32-bit core or 2 `ld` instructions on a 64-bit core.

Table 2 records the memory footprint (i.e., code footprint and static data footprint) of each software implementation. Again, numbers highlighted in **bold** are the best result for each metric. Where an entry for DEC-KEYEXP is zero, this implies that ENC-KEYEXP = DEC-KEYEXP so there is no overhead. Where an entry for DEC-KEYEXP

⁵Especially for researchers lacking expensive commercial synthesis tools and process design kits.

⁶We are unable to explain why the gate delay path should be longer for the 32-bit SCARV core than the 64-bit variant without a deep dive into the micro-architecture. We suspect it is an artifact of the sheer configurability (rather than optimality) of the Rocket core.

⁷RISC-V does not mandate support for misaligned loads and stores, so aligning the state this way ensures the best performance across all cores.

is non-zero, this implies that $\text{ENC-KEYEXP} \neq \text{DEC-KEYEXP}$, and the equivalent inverse cipher construction [FIP01, Section 5.3.5] is used. This allows DEC-KEYEXP to call ENC-KEYEXP , then perform some additional post processing, with the quoted footprint therefore reflecting the latter only. Table 3 and Table 4 record instruction (i.e., `iret`) and cycle counts of each implementation, as executed on the SCARV and Rocket cores respectively.

Discussion. Table 1 demonstrates that all ISE variants imply a modest area overhead relative to their host core. For the RV32 Rocket the area overhead of a synthesised Rocket Tile with caches was less than 1% in all cases. For the SCARV, the area overhead ranged between 13% (\mathcal{V}_5 (L)) and 3% (\mathcal{V}_3). Table 2 shows all ISE variants having similarly small memory footprints in terms of both instruction code and data. Beyond this, and per Section 3, the primary metric of interest is efficiency in terms of the latency-area product. This metric draws on data from Table 1 plus either Table 3 or Table 4 for the SCARV or Rocket core respectively. We note the small difference in instruction count in some cases between the cores. This is due to slightly different compiler behaviour at the measured function call sites in each core: the Rocket core saves an extra register to the stack. We deliberately omit the area of the host core from this calculation, as this fixed overhead dominates the final value and detracts from the comparison between ISEs themselves.

Table 5 captures the results for the Rocket core, although the same conclusion can be drawn for the SCARV core. Qualitatively, we place more of a weight on Encryption (ENC) and Decryption (DEC) vs. Encryption Key Expansion (ENC-KEYEXP) and Decryption Key Expansion (DEC-KEYEXP), because typically many ENC or DEC operations are performed per KEYEXP.

For a 32-bit core, our conclusion is that \mathcal{V}_3 is the best option. Despite not being the fastest (by a small margin), it is the most efficient, and simplest to implement. The area optimised \mathcal{V}_2 implementation sometimes comes close in efficiency, but requires a more complex multi-cycle implementation in this case. We note that \mathcal{V}_3 has relatively poor performance for the decryption key schedule. This is because it uses the Equivalent Inverse Cipher representation, and must first create an *encryption* orientated key schedule, before applying the Inverse MixColumns transform to each word in the key schedule. Each word requires 8 instructions to apply *only* the Inverse MixColumns transform. We believe this is reasonable, as one typically performs many block decryptions per key schedule operation. We also note that for the common AES-GCM usecase, decryption functionality is not necessary. We discuss this further in Section 4. Compared to past work, our implementation of \mathcal{V}_3 is slightly smaller than its original description in [Saa20]: 1149 v.s. 1240 gates. [Saa20] estimates a $5\times$ performance improvement, which is slightly better than our measured $4\times$ improvement, though this is dependant on relative memory access latencies. We would expect this improvement to increase in systems which store T-tables in (relatively) high latency flash memory. \mathcal{V}_3 performs considerably better than [TGS05], which achieves only a $2\times$ speedup in the best case. We note that despite needing the same number of instructions per round as \mathcal{V}_2 (based on [TGS05]), our \mathcal{V}_5 design suffers in terms of performance. This is due to the conversion between quadrant-packed and column-packed representations.

For a 64-bit core, \mathcal{V}_4 is the best option, which is somewhat obvious because it specifically makes use of the wider data-path. It is $10\times$ faster to perform a block encryption than a baseline T-table implementation targeting a 64-bit base RISC-V architecture. With reference to Table 4, note that the number of cycles per instruction executed is relatively high. This fact stems from use of the ROCC interface, in that forwarding of the result from an ISE instruction (that uses the ROCC) incurs an overhead vs. an ISE instruction; fine-grained integration of the AES-FU could therefore incrementally improve the results.

We believe it is sensible to standardise different ISEs for the RV32 and RV64 base ISAs.

Table 1: Hardware metrics for each ISE variant with encrypt and decrypt instructions. Area is measured in NAND2 gate equivalents and latency in gate delays.

ISA	Variant / Goal	ISE Area	ISE Latency	SCARV CPU + ISE area	Rocket CPU + ISE area
RV32IMC	Baseline			37325 (1.00×)	3501576 (1.000×)
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_1 (L)	3514	18	41746 (1.12×)	3508448 (1.002×)
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_1 (A)	2195	21	40171 (1.08×)	3506995 (1.002×)
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_2 (L)	3574	19	41132 (1.10×)	3508946 (1.002×)
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_2 (A)	1355	21	38777 (1.04×)	3506591 (1.001×)
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_3	1149	30	38546 (1.03×)	3506761 (1.001×)
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_5 (L)	4172	21	42035 (1.13×)	3510055 (1.002×)
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_5 (A)	1726	23	39144 (1.05×)	3507755 (1.002×)
RV64IMC	Baseline			N/A	3717607 (1.000×)
RV64IMC	\mathcal{V}_4	8226	28	N/A	3733786 (1.004×)

Table 2: Software memory footprint measured in bytes for each ISE variant.

ISA	Variant	ENC	DEC	ENC-KEYEXP	DEC-KEYEXP	.data
RV32IMC	T-table	804	804	154	174	5120
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_1	424	424	68	0	10
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_2	234	238	68	62	10
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_3	290	290	86	64	10
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_5	266	278	290	0	10
RV64IMC	\mathcal{V}_4	268	268	168	100	0

Table 3: Execution metrics for each ISE variant on the SCARV core. Note that the 64-bit \mathcal{V}_4 is absent, since there is no 64-bit SCARV core.

ISA	Variant / Goal	ENC		DEC		ENC-KEYEXP		DEC-KEYEXP	
		iret	cycles	iret	cycles	iret	cycles	iret	cycles
RV32IMC	T-table	938	1016	938	1037	430	515	1711	2307
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_1 (L)	512	575	512	576	198	302	204	321
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_1 (A)	512	735	512	736	198	342	204	361
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_2 (L)	215	274	216	285	198	302	335	615
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_2 (A)	215	501	216	522	198	332	335	753
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_3	238	291	238	286	219	312	659	1118
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_5 (L)	227	294	227	291	332	449	338	468
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_5 (A)	227	554	227	532	332	479	338	498

Table 4: Execution metrics for each ISE variant on the Rocket core. Note that the 64-bit \mathcal{V}_4 uses the 64-bit Rocket core; all others use the 32-bit Rocket core.

ISA	Variant / Goal	ENC		DEC		ENC-KEYEXP		DEC-KEYEXP	
		iret	cycles	iret	cycles	iret	cycles	iret	cycles
RV32IMC	T-table	934	1338	934	1003	430	569	1711	2167
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_1 (L)	513	659	513	613	199	268	200	270
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_1 (A)	513	791	513	725	199	308	200	310
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_2 (L)	216	351	217	354	199	263	336	496
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_2 (A)	216	503	217	534	199	293	336	637
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_3	239	396	239	410	220	462	660	2420
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_5 (L)	228	366	228	322	333	405	334	404
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_5 (A)	228	536	228	546	333	438	334	434
RV64IMC	T-table	934	1086	934	1015	431	479	1712	1995
RV64IMC	\mathcal{V}_4	76	115	76	133	61	199	131	286

This allows each ISE design to better suit the constraints of each base ISA. In the RV32 case, this acknowledges that such cores will most often appear in resource-constrained, embedded or IoT class devices. Hence, the most efficient ISE design is appropriate. For necessarily larger RV64-based designs, it makes sense to take advantage of the wider data-path, and acknowledge that these are more likely to be application class cores. Hence, they will place a higher value on performance than area-efficiency.

4 Using ISEs to implement AES-GCM

The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [NIS07] is a block cipher mode of operation which supports authenticated encryption. AES-GCM refers to an instantiation using AES as the underlying block cipher, which is the only case mandated by TLS 1.3 [Res18, Section 9.1]; the importance of this construction means GCM and AES are frequently considered together from an implementation and evaluation perspective. The computational core of AES-GCM is formed from two components. GCTR [NIS07, Section 6.5] is responsible for encryption using AES, and GHASH [NIS07, Section 6.4] is responsible for authentication. Having dealt with efficient implementation of AES and hence GCTR in Section 3, we turn our attention to GHASH. Rather than further embellish the ISE for AES, we instead focus on re-use of the proposed standard bit-manipulation extension [RV:19a, Section 17] (at the time of writing, the draft extension proposal is found in [ris]). This approach is attractive for two reasons. AES-GCM is a very common construction, but AES is not the only block cipher which can be used with GCM. Likewise, AES may not always be used with GCM, so separation of the two constructs from an instruction set point of view is prudent.

Implementation. GHASH [NIS07, Section 6.4] is a universal hash defined over the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$ constructed as $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/(x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1)$. Conversion of the input into the correct endianness can be realised using the `grev` (or generalised reverse) instruction, which can reverse the bits in each byte of an input word: 4 (resp. 2) `grev` instructions are therefore required on RV32IB (resp. RV64IB). Beyond this, operations in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$ dominate. Addition in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$ is equivalent to XOR: thus 4 (resp. 2) `xor` instructions are required on RV32IB (resp. RV64IB). Multiplication in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$ can be split into two steps: a (128×128) -bit polynomial multiplication, followed by a reduction of the 256-bit result modulo $x^{128} + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1$.

The multiplication step can be realised using pairs of “carry-less” multiplication instructions `clmul` and `clmulh`. These compute the least significant (resp. most-significant) half of a carry-less product (i.e., product over \mathbb{F}_2). Pairs of `clmul` and `clmulh` should be scheduled adjacently, allowing capable micro-architectures to fuse them. Use of a school book approach requires 16 (resp. 4) pairs on RV32IB (resp. RV64IB). Optimisation using the Karatsuba method requires 9 (resp. 3) such pairs on RV32IB (resp. RV64IB), plus some additional `xor` instructions.

The reduction step can be implemented in two ways: a shift-based reduction, made possible by the low Hamming weight of the primitive polynomial, or a multiplication-based reduction, analogous to the Montgomery or Barret methods. The most efficient approach depends on the relative execution latency of `clmul[h]` vs. `xor` and `s[1r]li`. Note that the entire GHASH operation, including `clmul[h]`, *must* exhibit data-oblivious execution latency (e.g., avoid data-dependent optimisations like early-termination) to avoid associated side-channel attacks (cf. [GOPT09]).

Discussion. Table 6 lists instruction counts for multiplication in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$, implemented using combinations of the base ISA, and approaches for the polynomial multiplication and reduction steps. Table 7 then models the execution latency (measured in cycles)

Table 5: Comparison of performance/area product. Each value is normalised to the largest product per column. The RV64IMC row is not normalised as there is no comparison point.

ISA	Variant / Goal	ENC		DEC		ENCKEYEXP		DECKEYEXP	
		iret	cycles	iret	cycles	iret	cycles	iret	cycles
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_1 (L)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.57	0.51	0.51
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_1 (A)	0.62	0.80	0.62	0.80	0.31	0.40	0.32	0.36
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_2 (L)	0.43	0.48	0.43	0.50	0.51	0.58	0.85	1.00
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_2 (A)	0.16	0.34	0.16	0.35	0.19	0.24	0.32	0.46
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_3	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.16	0.18	0.19	0.54	0.58
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_5 (L)	0.53	0.61	0.53	0.60	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.89
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_5 (A)	0.22	0.47	0.22	0.45	0.41	0.44	0.41	0.39
RV64IMC	\mathcal{V}_4	0.266	0.402	0.266	0.465	0.213	0.696	0.458	1.000

Table 6: Instruction counts for multiplication in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$ as used by GHASH.

ISA	Karatsuba	Reduce	grev	xor	s[1r]li	clmul	clmulh	Total
RV32IB	no	mul	4	36	0	20	20	80
RV32IB	no	shift	4	56	24	16	16	116
RV32IB	yes	mul	4	52	0	13	13	82
RV32IB	yes	shift	4	72	24	9	9	118
RV64IB	no	mul	2	10	0	6	6	24
RV64IB	no	shift	2	20	12	4	4	42
RV64IB	yes	mul	2	14	0	5	5	26
RV64IB	yes	shift	2	24	12	3	3	44

Table 7: Modelled cycle counts for multiplication in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$ as used by GHASH.

ISA	Karatsuba	Reduce	1-cycle	2-cycle	3-cycle	6-cycle
			clmul [h]	clmul [h]	clmul [h]	clmul [h]
RV32IB	no	mul	80	120	160	280
RV32IB	no	shift	116	148	180	276
RV32IB	yes	mul	82	108	134	212
RV32IB	yes	shift	118	136	154	208
RV64IB	no	mul	24	36	48	84
RV64IB	no	shift	42	50	58	82
RV64IB	yes	mul	26	36	46	76
RV64IB	yes	shift	44	50	56	74

Table 8: Hardware implementation metrics for each ISE variant with only encrypt instructions implemented. Area is measured in NAND2 gate equivalents and latency in gate delays.

ISA	Variant / Goal	ISE Area	ISE Latency	SCARV CPU + ISE area	Rocket CPU + ISE area
RV32IMC	Baseline			37325 (1.00×)	3501576 (1.000×)
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_1 (L)	1605	17	39154 (1.05×)	3506224 (1.001×)
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_1 (A)	1038	23	38561 (1.05×)	3505695 (1.001×)
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_2 (L)	1611	17	40337 (1.03×)	3506729 (1.001×)
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_2 (A)	780	21	38479 (1.08×)	3505910 (1.001×)
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_3	630	25	38301 (1.03×)	3506097 (1.001×)
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_5 (L)	1852	23	40626 (1.03×)	3507518 (1.001×)
RV32IMC	\mathcal{V}_5 (A)	1048	23	38749 (1.09×)	3506816 (1.001×)
RV64IMC	Baseline			N/A	3717607 (1.000×)
RV64IMC	\mathcal{V}_4	3790	27	N/A	3728235 (1.003×)

assuming `grev`, `xor`, and `s[1r]li` take 1 cycle. Although the model only considers an in-order core in line with those used in Section 3 and is focused on execution latency (vs. other pertinent metrics, such as code footprint), there are two obvious conclusions: if `clmul[h]` has 2 (or more) times the latency of `xor` and `s[1r]li`, a Karatsuba polynomial multiplication is preferable. If `clmul[h]` has 6 (or more) times the latency of `xor` and `s[1r]li`, a shift-based reduction is preferable.

We recommend the carry-less multiply instructions specified in the proposed RISC-V bit-manipulation extension also be included in the RISC-V cryptography extension. Implementers would otherwise need to implement (a subset of) the B extension, potentially adding functionality and cost that is not necessary.

An important consideration for the GCTR component of GCM is that it only requires the encryption function for a block cipher. Given this, we re-evaluate the hardware costs of each ISE, assuming that only the encryption instructions are implemented. These results are shown in Table 8. Compared to the hardware results for encrypt and decrypt being implemented in Table 1, the area overhead for all ISE variants is approximately halved, and there is a small reduction in circuit depth. For our recommended variants, \mathcal{V}_3 and \mathcal{V}_4 , the area savings when only encryption instructions are implemented are $0.46\times$ and $0.54\times$ respectively. For very constrained devices which have exact functionality requirements, we believe that making implementation of the decryption instruction optional could be beneficial. If these systems *do* require AES decryption, it could still be implemented in software, with a performance and code size similar to the baseline implementations in Table 3 and Table 4.

5 Conclusion

Motivated by ongoing efforts to standardise support for AES in RISC-V, we have implemented and evaluated five ISE designs on two different RISC-V compliant base micro-architectures. Our conclusion is that 1) \mathcal{V}_3 is the best option for AES on 32-bit cores, 2) \mathcal{V}_4 is the best option for AES on 64-bit cores, and 3) the standard B [RV:19a, Section 17] extension can combine with either option to support AES-GCM.

Our evaluations of the different ISEs have focused primarily on performance, code size and hardware cost metrics. Because our work is a departure from historic AES ISEs in that they are designed to be suitable for small, embedded CPU cores, power and EM side-channel security will likely be a consideration for implementations of these ISEs. We consider side-channel secure ISE design to be an open problem, particularly in terms of making the same code portably side-channel secure across multiple implementations of the same ISE. Future efforts would be well spent in studying this problem, perhaps looking at creating custom extensions based on the recommendations here to support side-channel security.

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A Example AES round function implementations

```

1  lw      a0, 0(a4)      // Load Round Key
2  lw      a1, 4(a4)
3  lw      a2, 8(a4)
4  lw      a3, 12(a4)
5  xor     a4, a4, a0     // Add Round Key
6  xor     a5, a5, a1
7  xor     a6, a6, a2
8  xor     a7, a7, a3
9  saes.v1.encs a0, a4    // SubBytes
10 saes.v1.encs a1, a5
11 saes.v1.encs a2, a6
12 saes.v1.encs a3, a7
13
14 // Shift Rows
14 and     a4, t0, t6 ; and a5, t1, t6
15 and     a6, t2, t6 ; and a7, t3, t6
16 slli   t4, t6, 0x8 ; and t5, t0, t4
17 or     a7, a7, t5 ; and t5, t3, t4
18 or     a6, a6, t5 ; and t5, t2, t4
19 or     a5, a5, t5 ; and t5, t1, t4
20 or     a4, a4, t5 ; slli t4, t4, 0x8
21 and     t5, t2, t4 ; or a4, a4, t5
22 and     t5, t3, t4 ; or a5, a5, t5
23 and     t5, t0, t4 ; or a6, a6, t5
24 and     t5, t1, t4 ; or a7, a7, t5
25 slli   t4, t4, 0x8 ; and t5, t3, t4
26 or     a4, a4, t5 ; and t5, t0, t4
27 or     a5, a5, t5 ; and t5, t1, t4
28 or     a6, a6, t5 ; and t5, t2, t4
29 or     a7, a7, t5
30 saes.v1.encm t0, a4    // MixColumns
31 saes.v1.encm t1, a5
32 saes.v1.encm t2, a6
33 saes.v1.encm t3, a7

```

Figure 7: An AES encryption round implemented using \mathcal{V}_1 .

```

1  lw      a0, 0(a4)      // Load Round Key
2  lw      a1, 4(a4)
3  lw      a2, 8(a4)
4  lw      a3, 12(a4)
5  xor     t0, t0, a0     // Add Round Key
6  xor     t1, t1, a1
7  xor     t2, t2, a2
8  xor     t3, t3, a3
9  saes.v2.sub.enc a0, t0, t1 // SubBytes / ShiftRows
10 saes.v2.sub.enc a1, t2, t3
11 saes.v2.sub.enc a2, t1, t2
12 saes.v2.sub.enc a3, t3, t0
13 saes.v2.mix.enc t0, a0, a1 // ShiftRows / MixColumns
14 saes.v2.mix.enc t1, a2, a3
15 saes.v2.mix.enc t2, a1, a0
16 saes.v2.mix.enc t3, a3, a2

```

Figure 8: An AES encryption round implemented using \mathcal{V}_2 .

```

1 lw          a0, 16(RK)    // Load Round Key
2 lw          a1, 20(RK)
3 lw          a2, 24(RK)
4 lw          a3, 28(RK)    // t0,t1,t2,t3 contains current round state.
5 saes.v3.encsm a0, a0, t0, 0 // Next state for column 0.
6 saes.v3.encsm a0, a0, t1, 1 // Current column 0 in t0.
7 saes.v3.encsm a0, a0, t2, 2 // Next column 0 accumulates in a0
8 saes.v3.encsm a0, a0, t3, 3
9 saes.v3.encsm a1, a1, t1, 0 // Next state for column 1.
10 saes.v3.encsm a1, a1, t2, 1
11 saes.v3.encsm a1, a1, t3, 2
12 saes.v3.encsm a1, a1, t0, 3
13 saes.v3.encsm a2, a2, t2, 0 // Next state for column 2.
14 saes.v3.encsm a2, a2, t3, 1
15 saes.v3.encsm a2, a2, t0, 2
16 saes.v3.encsm a2, a2, t1, 3
17 saes.v3.encsm a3, a3, t3, 0 // Next state for column 3.
18 saes.v3.encsm a3, a3, t0, 1
19 saes.v3.encsm a3, a3, t1, 2
20 saes.v3.encsm a3, a3, t2, 3 // a0,a1,a2,a3 contains new round state

```

Figure 9: An AES encryption round implemented using \mathcal{V}_3 .

```

1 ld          a0, 0(a4)    // Load round key as double words.
2 ld          a1, 8(a4)
3 xor         t0, t0, a0 // Add round key for 2 columns at a time.
4 xor         t1, t1, a1
5 aes.v4.encsm t2, t0, t1 // Next round state: columns 0, 1
6 aes.v4.encsm t3, t1, t0 // columns 2, 3 - Note swapped rs1/rs2

```

Figure 10: An AES encryption round implemented using \mathcal{V}_4 .

```

1 lw          a0, 0(a4)    // Load Round Key
2 lw          a1, 4(a4)
3 lw          a2, 8(a4)
4 lw          a3, 12(a4)
5 xor         t0, t0, a0 // Add Round Key
6 xor         t1, t1, a1
7 xor         t2, t2, a2
8 xor         t3, t3, a3
9 saes.v5.esrsub.lo a0, t0, t1 // Quad 0: SubBytes / ShiftRows
10 saes.v5.esrsub.lo a1, t1, t0 // Quad 1
11 saes.v5.esrsub.hi a2, t2, t3 // Quad 2
12 saes.v5.esrsub.hi a3, t3, t2 // Quad 3
13 saes.v5.emix t0, a0, a2 // Quad 0: ShiftRows / MixColumns
14 saes.v5.emix t1, a1, a3 // Quad 1
15 saes.v5.emix t2, a2, a0 // Quad 2
16 saes.v5.emix t3, a3, a1 // Quad 3

```

Figure 11: An AES encryption round implemented using \mathcal{V}_5 .

